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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PERRY BUCKNER, et al., 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
-vs-
AARON KENNARD. as Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County. SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
OFFICE and SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DEPUTY SHERIFF'S MERIT SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20020178-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Defendants/Appellants (hereafter "the County") submit the following reply brief in 
further support of their appeal from the judgment and rulings below. 
STATEMENT OF CORRECTED FACTS 
In their responsive brief, the Appellees (hereafter, "the Deputies") have elected to 
treat the instant action as though it were merely a continuation or later phase of the Diamant 
lawsuit, though they cannot dispute that the Diamant complaint was resolved by a stipulated 
dismissal with prejudice, without any class certification. See Appellants' Brief, Addendum 
D. Although the Deputies had time to petition the district court for an order permitting them 
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to enter into the Diamant lawsuit,1 they did not do so. Thus, the Deputies were not parties to 
the Diamant stipulation, which allowed for petitioning parties to arbitrate after dismissal of 
the lawsuit, nor did they seek to set aside the stipulation or the order of dismissal. After the 
dismissal, a few plaintiffs in this case did try to enter the arbitration proceeding without 
authority from the district court and were denied that right. They pursued this effort in the 
district court in the Taylor case and lost. They did not appeal.2 Nonetheless, they continue 
to seek the benefits of the Diamant settlement by using the instant action as the vehicle. 
The County has not agreed that it was required to pay its deputies equitably. See 
Appellees' Br. at 4-5. No record citation or other evidence is provided for this assertion. 
Moreover, neither the stipulation entered into by the County in Diamant, nor the order of 
dismissal, nor the arbitrated settlement later reached in Diamant obligated the County to pay 
all its deputies equitably or to be bound vis-a-vis the Deputies in this action by the relief the 
deputies in Diamant ultimately obtained. See Appellants' Brief, Addenda D and E. 
It is also not true that the County is required to base each employee's compensation 
upon their seniority with the County. The County must only adopt and comply with a 
compensation plan established under Utah Code Ann. §17-30-5, which grants the County 
*The Deputies rely on an April 1991 report as evidence of a pay inequity. The 
stipulated dismissal was entered in Diamant on December 19, 1994. The Diamant 
settlement was not reached until November 27, 1996, ten months after the instant action 
was filed. 
2See Appellants' Br. at 10 n.7. 
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discretion to create a compensation system that allows the variances in pay to which these 
Deputies object. 
In this action the Deputies presented their claims as individuals, not as representatives 
of a class. (R. 4179 at 3,6). The Deputies nonetheless refer to themselves frequently as a class 
and to the Diamant plaintiffs as a class, although the instant complaint did not even plead a 
class. Appellants' Brief, Addendum G. The only pleading of a class in the Diamant 
complaint is in paragraph 11, under their constitutional tort cause of action: "Plaintiffs bring 
this claim on behalf of themselves and each person who is a member of the following class 
of employees consisting of all persons who are employed by Salt Lake County and who have 
worked more than eight (8) hours in any given day of work for the four (4) years immediately 
preceding the filing of this Complaint." See R. 505-519 (Diamant Complaint). Neither 
Diamant nor the instant case was ever certified as a class action. 
The Deputies state several times that Diamant involved the same claim or issue as this 
matter. See Appellees' Br. at 25. In fact, a review of the two complaints demonstrates that 
the Diamant plaintiffs and these plaintiffs sought additional compensation under different 
legal theories. See Appellants' Br. at 8 & Addendum G; R. 505-519 (Diamant Complaint). 
The County raised in the trial court its arguments that application of res judicata or 
collateral estoppel was improper because the Deputies failed to establish the prerequisites for 
their application. In particular, the County focused on the lack of a formal judgment, the lack 
of privity, and the dissimilarity in the parties' claims. (R. 2810-2813). 
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The Deputies rely heavily on their claims being characterized now as equitable (even 
though the Diamant plaintiffs raised no equitable claims), despite their characterization in 
the complaint as causes of action for breaches of contract and statute for which the Deputies 
sought damages. See Appellants' Brief, Addendum G. In ruling on the motions for summary 
judgment, the trial court did not view the Deputies' claims as equitable ones that are not 
subject to the notice of claim requirement. (R. 3008-3011). 
Finally, the trial court specifically addressed the County's objection to the Deputies' 
failure to file a notice of claim and concluded that the Notice of Claim filed in August 1995 
was legally sufficient for all 124 Deputies, including the unnamed ones. See, Appellants' 
Brief, Addendum L. The trial court did not consider whether the County should be estopped 
to raise noncompliance with §63-30-11(2). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE 
STATUTORY CLAIMS OF THE 105 PLAINTIFF DEPUTIES WHO 
WERE NOT NAMED IN THE NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Section 63-30-11(2) of the Governmental Immunity Act provides that "[a]ny person 
having a claim for injury" against a governmental entity or employee "shall file a written 
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action. . . ." Naming some of the 
claimants in a notice of claim is insufficient to support an action by other, unnamed claimants 
with similar claims. Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379. 
In the instant case, the Deputies sought and were awarded judgment for additional 
compensation totaling more than $1 million from their governmental entity employer, Salt 
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Lake County, for back pay, back benefits, and back retirement contributions (and interest) 
that they claimed the County had wrongfully failed to pay them from 19883 until September 
1,1994. They asserted two causes of action, one for statutory violation and one for contract 
breach, and a third cause of action that was dismissed. Only 19 of these 124 plaintiff 
Deputies filed a notice of claim, yet the trial court refused to dismiss the unnamed Deputies' 
cause of action for statutory violation. Giving res judicata effect to an out-of court settlement 
in a prior dispute involving other deputies and other legal theories, the trial court never 
evaluated the merits of the Deputies' claims and refused to allow the County to defend itself 
in any way. Instead, the trial court simply calculated and awarded damages to most of the 
124 Deputies, without identifying the legal basis for the County's liability. 
A. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction must be decided before the res judicata issue. 
Defendants contend on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the statutory claims of the 105 plaintiff Deputies who were not named in the notice of 
claim. In their response, Plaintiffs have suggested that this notice of claim issue will be 
rendered "moot" if this Court first concludes that the trial court correctly applied res judicata 
to prevent defendants from litigating liability in this lawsuit. Appellees' Br. at 29-30. This 
is clearly not the case. 
Compliance with statutory notice of claim requirements is necessary to confer subject 
matter jurisdiction on the trial court to even consider the claims asserted by the Deputies. See 
3In an unnoticed typographical error, the County defendants erroneously gave this 
year as 1998 in their opening brief. See Appellants' Br. at 6, line 6. 
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Wheeler v. McPherson. 2002 UT 16, ^ 9,40 P.3d 632; Thomas v. Lewis. 2001 UT 49, f 13, 
26 P.3d 217; Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36,1 18, 977 P.2d 1201. If the trial 
court lacks such jurisdiction, those claims must be dismissed. See, e.g.. Wheeler. 2002 UT 
16, TJ16 ; Thomas. 2001 UT 49, <|fl[12-14, 21. Accordingly, the subject matter jurisdiction 
issue presented on appeal must be addressed by this Court first as a threshold issue before 
treating any other arguments. Thomas. 2001 UT 49, ^13. Thus, it is impossible for any 
ruling on the secondary res judicata issue to render the jurisdictional issue moot. 
B. The Deputies' cause of action to recover damages for violation of state statutes is a 
legal claim subject to the notice of claim requirement in §63-30-11, 
The Deputies concede in their brief that breach of an employment contract was not 
the basis for the trial court's award of summary judgment in their favor. Appellees' Br. at 
36. In addition, Deputies do not dispute that their cause of action for alleged violation of 
statutes is, on its face, a legal claim. 
Instead, the Deputies assert that the claims in this lawsuit were really not for breaches 
of statute or contract - they were "equitable claims" that are not subject to §63-30-11 fs 
mandate, citing American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 759-60 (Utah 
1992) and El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp.. 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977). 
Appellees' Br. at 29-32. The Court should simply read the Deputies' complaint and the 
judgment they were awarded by the trial court and reject this contention, as their claim for 
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damages for violation of state statutes4 is patently a legal claim, not an equitable one. 
An action in equity "seeks equitable relief, such as an injunction or specific 
performance, as opposed to damages." Black's Law Dictionary 29 (1999). In contrast, 
under the Governmental Immunity Act, a "claim" subject to the Act is "any claim or cause 
of action for money or damages against a governmental entity... ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-2(1) (1997).5 
In their first cause of action, the Deputies alleged that defendants had injured them by 
violating a statutory obligation imposed by Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-30-5 and 17-33-5(3)(b).6 
As redress, the Deputies demanded judgment against defendants "in an amount of 
appropriate back pay, benefits, court costs and attorneys' fees in an amount to be proven at 
trial but not less than $200,000." (R. 264; Third Amended Complaint, at 11; Appellants' 
Brief, Addendum G). The Deputies sought only money damages for extra compensation up 
to September 1994. They neither sought, nor were awarded, equitable relief. 
Under §63-30-2(1), the Deputies' claim for money damages allegedly caused by 
defendants' violation of state statutes is a legal claim that is subject to the Governmental 
Immunity Act's notice of claim requirement. See, e.g.. Thomas, 2001 UT 49, ffl[12-14 
4The Deputies' claim for breach of contract (R. 263; Addendum G) is not subject 
to the notice of claim requirement. See. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1997). Their cause of 
action for negligent misrepresentation was dismissed by the trial court. (R. 3065-3068). 
5The language of the relevant portions of the Governmental Immunity Act has not 
changed since 1993. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-2, -11(2) (1993) 
6R. 261; Third Amended Complaint, First Claim for Relief, ffif 19-23 (Appellants' 
Brief, Addendum G). 
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(action seeking damages for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-1 (1996)); see also Urban 
Renewal Agency v. Lackey, 549 P.2d 657, 659 (Or. 1976) ("When statutes are enacted 
which undertake to declare rights and establish a standard of conduct for their protection, any 
acts or omissions in violation of such statute, which destroy the enjoyment of such rights, 
may be treated as legal wrongs or torts...."); Butterfield v. State, 987 P.2d 569 (Or. App. 
1999) (claims for unpaid overtime pay based on rights or duties created by statute are subject 
to notice of claim requirement). 
The Deputies nonetheless argue that their claim is equitable because the back pay they 
were awarded is an equitable form of relief, citing Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 
1034 (Utah 1995). This reliance is misplaced, as Thurston actually hurts their cause. In 
Thurston this Court recognized reinstatement as an equitable remedy, but rejected the 
terminated employee's claim that reinstatement with back pay was the only appropriate way 
to remedy his wrongful termination through violation of state law. IcL at 1041-42. The Court 
also noted that reinstatement would be available as an equitable remedy only if damages 
(back pay), were inadequate or unascertainable: 
Reinstatement, a type of specific performance, is an equitable remedy. 
The right to an equitable remedy is an exceptional one, and absent statutory 
mandate, equitable relief should be granted only when a court determines that 
damages are inadequate and that equitable relief will result in more perfect and 
complete justice. 
M a t 1040. 
Finally, the distinction between actions at law and actions in equity is based on the 
nature of the action, not the form of the relief granted, as the Deputies contend here. See 
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UTCO Assoc. Ltd. v. Zimmerman. 2001 UT App 117, If 19 n.3,27 P.3d 177. Thus, even if 
the Deputies had sought and received some equitable relief because damages alone were 
inadequate, that fact would not have transformed their legal cause of action for statutory 
violation into an equitable claim exempt from the notice of claim requirement of §63-30-
11(2). 
C. Section 63-30-11(2) does not permit a "class action notice of claim" to be filed on 
behalf of unnamed persons, either by their agent or by other claimants who are named. 
Counsel for Appellees filed a Notice of Claim in August 1995, expressly naming 19 
of the Deputies in this case and purporting to file it on behalf of them "and others whose 
identities are not known at this time," all of whom were referred to in the notice as 
"Claimants." The notice was signed by appellees' counsel, Bryon Benevento, as "Attorney 
for Claimants." (R. 885; Appellants' Brief, Addendum F). 
On appeal, the 105 unnamed Deputies argue that they complied with §63-30-11(2) 
because: (a) they are covered by the August 1995 notice of claim filed by the 19 named 
Deputies (R. 885; Appellants' Brief, Addendum F); or (b) they are covered by the Notice of 
Claim filed in April 1991 by two deputies who later filed the Diamant lawsuit on behalf of 
themselves and "all persons similarly situated in Salt Lake County government" (R. 4176, 
second Tab B); or (c) they are covered by the August 1995 notice of claim filed by the 19 
named Deputies because it was signed by Mr. Benevento as their agent. Appellees' Br. at 
32-34. 
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As authority for the first two of these arguments, the Deputies cite Moreno v. Board 
of Education. 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996). In Moreno, this Court concluded that a wrongful 
death action can be maintained by a legal guardian only on behalf of the deceased's heirs, not 
on the guardian's behalf. IcL at 889, 892. Because of this, a majority of the Court also 
concluded that a notice of claim filed by legal guardians about a claim for the wrongful death 
of a minor was legally sufficient even though the minor's unnamed heir, not the legal 
guardians, was entitled to damages for loss of the minor's companionship. IcL at 892 (Howe, 
J., separate opinion, joined by Stewart and Durham). Thus, the legal sufficiency of the 
guardians' notice of claim was not defeated by the guardians' good faith mistake of law 
about the lawful beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. See icL. 
The court of appeals has read Moreno as allowing a named party who has standing 
through statutory authorization to bring an action, likewise has standing to file a legally 
sufficient notice of claim under §63-30-11 as to an unnamed party who is entitled to "all or 
a portion of the same claim[.]" Great West Casualty Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 2001 UT 
App 54, Tf 15, 21 P.3d 240. Applying this interpretation of Moreno, the court of appeals 
refused to allow an unnamed party to "piggyback" onto the notice of claim filed by the 
named party because the named party lacked standing to recover for, and thus to file a notice 
of claim for, property damage for which only the unnamed party could get redress. M, 2002 
UT App 54, f 16. Similarly, in the instant case the deputies named in the April 1991 and the 
August 1995 notices of claim lacked standing to bring suit for, and thus to file an effective 
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notice of claim for, any damages suffered by the unnamed deputies who claimed to have been 
under compensated until September 1994. 
Moreno does not stand for the sweeping proposition that one named claimant can file 
a notice of claim that is legally sufficient under §63-30-11 (2) as to any unnamed person with 
a similar, though not the same, claim. Any doubts in this regard were put to rest by the more 
recent case of Pigs Gun Club, in which this Court rejected the argument that the Notice of 
Claim filed by named parties was legally sufficient as to unnamed parties with similar claims. 
The Deputies would have this Court read Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as 
modifying §63-30-11 (2) by authorizing class action notices filed by a named party of behalf 
of other unnamed persons with similar, but not the same, claims. They cite no authority for 
their remarkable contention that this Court's procedural rule can trump the Legislature's 
enumerated substantive prerequisites for suits filed under the Governmental Immunity Act. 
See Appellees' Br. at 34. This omission is understandable since there is no such authority. 
The purpose of a notice of claim is to allow the governmental entity to correct the 
condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without 
costly litigation. Pigs Gun Club, 2002 UT 17, f 10; Larson v. Park City. 995 P.2d 343,345-
46 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, this Court has repeatedly held that strict compliance with the 
Act is a condition precedent to the right to bring suit. See, e.g.. Pigs Gun Club. 2002 UT 17, 
f 10; Rushton, 1999 UT 36, f 19; Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480,482 
(Utah 1975). 
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The plain language of § 63-30-11(2) requires "[a]ny person having a claim for injury" 
to file a notice of claim. It does not permit "class action notices of claim."7 To do so would 
defeat the legislature's clear intent and would thwart the purposes of the notice of claim. 
Governmental entities receiving "class action notices of claim" could not assess the extent 
of their liability, or fix the myriad conditions that might be injuring an unknown number of 
unknown persons, or settle with such an unidentified group prior to litigation. For these 
reasons, the Court should reject the Deputies' arguments that either the 1991 or the 1995 
Notice of Claim was legally sufficient to satisfy §63-30-11 (2) for the 105 unnamed Deputies. 
The Deputies' agency argument is also meritless. They do not explain how Mr. 
Benevento can even be the agent of principals whose identity he does not know, and there 
is no record evidence of such an agency relationship. See Mecham v. Consolidated Oil & 
Transp.. Inc., 2002 UT App 251, ^ 13, 53 P.3d 479 (agency is a fiduciary relationship 
resulting from the consent by a principal that the agent shall act on his behalf). Even if he 
were the agent of the 105 unnamed deputies, his signature on the 1995 Notice of Claim 
would comply with the signature requirements of §63-30-1 l(3)(b)(i), but not with §63-30-
11(2), which mandates that "each plaintiffs name must be on the notice of claim." Pigs 
Gun Club. 2002 UT 17, f 10 (emphasis added). 
D. The Deputies have not established the elements of estoppel or satisfied the higher 
standard for its use against the County, 
7Houghton v. Utah Dep't of Health. 2002 UT 101, is no help to the Deputies on 
this point, as the jurisdictional issue of whether § 63-30-11(2) allows class action notices 
of claim was not addressed by the parties or by the courts. 
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The Deputies contend that the County should be estopped from raising noncompliance 
with §63-30-11(2). They point to two items in the record (R. 2792 and R. 2479, attached 
here as Addendum A), which purportedly prove they were lulled by the County into not filing 
a Notice of Claim. Appellees' Br. at 35. The first is a response by one plaintiff, Kathy 
Aiken, to an interrogatory. She was asked for detailed facts to support the allegation in 
paragraph 13 of the Deputies' complaint that the plaintiffs "were informed by 
representatives of the Sheriffs Office that they should wait until a final decision was reached 
in the Diamant case before taking any further steps to remedy the pay inequities." (R. 259-60; 
Appellants' Brief, Addendum G, at 6-7). Ms. Aiken responded: 
Plaintiff is a member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Association 
("Association"). The Association, through its elected officers, was informed 
by Sheriff Kennard and other representatives of the Sheriffs Office that the 
interests of all sworn employees were represented in the Diamant action; that 
the County would pay all the employees their respective back pay in the event 
the arbitrator found the existence of a pay inequity; and that employees should 
not file separate actions or grievances because it would delay and complicate 
the resolution of the issues presented in the Diamant action. [8] Plaintiff also 
refers to the sworn deposition testimony of former Commissioner James 
Bradley. Mr. Bradley testified that the County agreed to pay all sworn 
employees their respective back pay if the arbitrator found the existence of a 
pay inequity. 
(R. 2792-93). She gave the same response to Interrogatory 5, which asked about the 
allegation in paragraph 14 of the complaint that the Deputies were assured that they would 
8In the summary judgement proceeding, the County disputed that such 
representations were made and pointed to evidence that employees were encouraged to 
pursue their rights. Sheriff Kennard's affidavit also said he had expressed his philosophy 
that employees should be treated the same, but had also acknowledged his inability to 
make that happen. (R. 2832; Appellant's Brief, Addendum K at 4). 
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be treated the same as the named plaintiffs in the Diamant arbitration. (R. 260, Appellants5 
Brief, Addendum G at 7). 
Ms. Aiken's response mischaracterizes the second item tendered by the Deputies to 
support their estoppel argument, a sentence from a February 1998 deposition by former 
Commissioner Bradley. Bradley said nothing about an agreement by the County. Asked 
whether he understood the Diamant action to have been on behalf of a few deputies or all 
deputies, he responded: "I didn't think it was a class action. I thought it was some specific 
people who brought suit." He added: "I mean, if [other deputies not a part of Diamant] 
could make their case, we would presume that everybody else that fell into a similar situation 
should be treated the same as they." (R. 2479 at 27; Addendum A). 
Estoppel requires reasonable action (or inaction) by one party that is taken (or not 
taken) on the basis of a statement, admission, act, or omission of the party to be estopped. 
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 72 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989). Even if the 
elements of estoppel are present, however, it generally not assertable against the government 
or a governmental entity. Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n. 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 
1992); Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). There is a limited 
exception to this rule only under "unusual circumstances" where the facts, measured against 
a "high standard of proof," may be "found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered 
. . . of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Anderson. 839 P.2d at 827. "The few 
cases in which Utah courts have permitted estoppel against the government have involved 
very specific written representations by authorized government entities." Id. 
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The statements tendered by the Deputies are insufficient to estop the County from 
raising noncompliance with §63-30-11 (2). Bradley merely described a presumption and an 
opinion he thought was held by a royal "we" after the Diamant arbitration concluded. It 
involves no representation at all by the County on which the Deputies could have relied. See 
Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah 1992) (absent any reasonable 
reliance on representations made by defendant, plaintiff must take reasonable steps to pursue 
claim in timely manner). 
Ms. Aiken's vague hearsay report of Sheriff Kennard "informing" the Sheriffs 
Association on some unstated date is also unavailing. No representation was made to or 
relayed to her or to any other of the 105 Deputies asserting estoppel who did not file a Notice 
of Claim. Even if Sheriff Kennard had made such a representation, but see note 8 supra, any 
reliance by the 105 unnamed Deputies would have been unreasonable, as demonstrated by 
the fact that the 19 named Deputies did file a Notice of Claim. In any event, there is no 
evidence he was authorized to bind the County with any agreement regarding back pay. 
In sum, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the statutory 
claims of the 105 Deputies who were not named in the August 1995 Notice of Claim. The 
court was left with subject matter jurisdiction over the statutory claims of the 19 Deputies 
who were named in the August 1995 Notice of Claim, as well as the breach of contract 
claims of all 124 Deputies. 
II. THE COUNTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO DEFEND 
AGAINST THE DEPUTIES' CLAIMS, SINCE THE DEPUTIES DID 
NOT ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA 
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The pivotal issue in this appeal is whether the outcome reached during the arbitration 
proceeding after dismissal of the Diamant lawsuit with prejudice should be given res judicata 
effect, precluding the County from defending itself on the Deputies' claims. The County 
believes the judgment entered in the Deputies' favor must be vacated because they failed to 
establish the requisite elements for res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
A common element to both branches of the doctrine is that the prior proceeding must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.9 In re General Determination of Rights to 
the Use of All the Water. 1999 UT 39, [^15, 982 P.2d 65. The Deputies identify the 
arbitrator's orders in Diamant as the final "judgment" relied upon. However, the parties 
agreed to a prior stipulated dismissal with prejudice of the Diamant complaint. See 
Appellants' Brief, Addendum D; Appellees' Brief Addenda 12 & 13. 
In their stipulation, the Diamant parties agreed "that plaintiffs may elect to proceed 
administratively by filing a 'Notice of Grievance' with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office 
on the issue of 'Back Pay'." (R. 141; Appellants' Brief, Addendum D). The administrative 
remedy to resolve the back pay issue was arbitration, and the decision of the arbitrator on any 
grievances was to be binding on the parties. M Eleven persons who were named plaintiffs 
in Diamant did not pursue the administrative remedy. (R. 2781; Appellants' Brief, 
Addendum E). Significantly, the Diamant plaintiffs also stipulated to release Salt Lake 
County and the defendant Commissioners "from any claims, demands, causes of action or 
9This argument was raised in the trial court. (R. 2830-31; 2810-11; 2821-23). 
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damages arising from the above-entitled lawsuit filed by plaintiffs in 1992." (R. 141; 
Appellants' Brief, Addendum D). 
In effect, the Deputies argue that the County's stipulation in Diamant bound it to the 
arbitrator's decision on any type of compensation claim, in any future litigation, by any other 
deputies. See Appellees' Br. at 25-27. It is clear from the stipulation that the County was 
not making such a foolish bargain. Instead, the County agreed to be bound by the 
administrative decision only on the claim of "back pay" and only vis-a-vis the subset of 
deputies who were named plaintiffs in the Diamant complaint and who, after dismissal of the 
lawsuit, filed an administrative grievance under the strictures laid out in the stipulation. And 
the County did so in exchange for a release of liability only from that subset of deputies. 
Thus, the back pay issues ultimately resolved by the arbitrator (R. 2786) did not involve the 
same claims or the same parties as this case, both of which are requisite elements of res 
judicata. See Marcris & Assocs. v. Newavs. 2000 UT 93, ^ 20, 16 P.3d 1214. C£ Coffev 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 961 F.2d 922,925 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992) (collateral estoppel bars 
relitigation of factual issues previously decided through court-ordered arbitration by the same 
parties on the same issue). 
The Deputies nonetheless convinced the trial court that the favorable result ultimately 
obtained by a subset of the named plaintiffs in Diamant should be given automatic and 
preclusive effect in this case, involving deputies who were never a part of Diamant. But if 
these Deputies get to share in the benefits received by the subset of Diamant plaintiffs as a 
result of the stipulation, why do they not have to suffer the burdens that the subset agreed to 
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in the stipulation? In other words, why are these Deputies not precluded from pursuing the 
County in this action by the Diamant plaintiffs' release of the County in the same stipulation 
"from any claims, demands, causes of action or damages arising from the above-entitled 
lawsuit"? 
After all, the Deputies insist that, for purposes of claim preclusion, they are "in 
privity" with the named plaintiffs in Diamant because "the named plaintiffs in the Diamant 
Lawsuit represented the common legal rights of all sworn employees of the Sheriffs Office, 
including the Sworn Officers, and obtained rulings concerning those legal rights that were 
favorable." Appellees' Br. at 27. The Deputies should not be allowed to pick and choose 
which portions of the Diamant litigation they want to live with and which they wish to 
eschew. 
In order to demonstrate the purported similarity in their legal interests, Deputies again 
rely on their mischaracterization of Diamant as a class action. See Appellees' Br. at 23. As 
previously noted, that lawsuit was never certified as a class action before it was dismissed. 
Moreover, the only "class" that was even pleaded in Diamant was a class of County 
employees who had "worked more than eight (8) hours in any given day of work for the four 
(4) years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint." (R. 505-519, Diamant 
Complaint at 1f 11-13). In addition, this putative class's only pleaded claim was a 
constitutional tort under the Utah Constitution, /d^ not a claim for breach of contract or 
statute. 
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The Deputies' self-servingly broad view of privity conflicts with current case law. 
E.g.. Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978) (one in privity is a person so 
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right). It also turns Rule 
23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on its head. If the outcome of a lawsuit filed as a class 
action is binding on putative unnamed class members because they are "in privity" with 
named class members, even if no class is ever certified, the strict requirements in Rule 
23(a)-(c) for certifying and maintaining a class action would be rendered meaningless. 
Putative class members would be bound by the outcome of a case without ever receiving the 
notice of the pending action and of the opportunity to be excluded from the class, to which 
the court rule and due process entitle them. See Workman v. Nagle Construction Inc.. 802 
P.2d 749, 753 (Utah App. 1990). This Court should, therefore, reject the Deputies' claim 
that they are in privity with the Diamant deputies who were awarded back pay during the 
administrative process after their lawsuit was dismissed. 
The County urges this Court to conclude that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) 
cannot be used against the State and other governmental entities unless there is full mutuality 
of parties in the prior and current proceedings. See Appellants' Br. at 29-30.10 As the United 
States Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Mendoza. 464 U.S. 154, 163-64 
(1984), the government is routinely involved in lawsuits with different parties that involve 
10This argument was encompassed by the County's arguments in the trial court 
concerning the Deputies' failure to establish all the requisite elements for application of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Appellants' Br. at 3. 
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the same legal issues. Binding the government forever afterwards to the outcome in the very 
first of those lawsuits-precisely the result the Deputies sought and obtained here from the 
trial court-disserves the public interest by unnecessarily hobbling state government. 
If the Court adopts the full mutuality requirement, it is apparent that it is lacking here. 
These Deputies were not named or unnamed plaintiffs in the Diamant case and were not 
putative members of the one narrow class described in the Diamant complaint. And, of 
course, no class was ever certified in Diamant. Therefore, the Deputies could not use the 
Diamant outcome to assert res judicata against the County. 
Because the Deputies failed to establish the elements of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel, the trial court erred in precluding the County from defending itself in this action 
and in awarding summary judgment to the Deputies. 
III. THE ACTIONS COMPLAINED OF ARE GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTIONS FOR WHICH IMMUNITY HAS NOT BEEN WAIVED 
The County contends that its adoption and use of a classification and compensation 
plan for its employees is a governmental function entitled to immunity. See_ Utah Code Ann 
§ 63-30-3(l)(1997);seealso^iA § 63-30-2(4)(a)(defining"governmental function"). There 
is no waiver of this immunity that would allow the Deputies to pursue their statutory claims 
for money damages. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-5 to -10 (1997); Appellants' Br. at 36-
37. 
In their response, the Deputies first contend that, like all other defenses the County 
sought to raise in this action, this one is barred by res judicata because of the Diamant 
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arbitrator's award. The reasons that the Diamant award should not be given res judicata 
effect in the instant case are addressed above in Point II and in the County's opening brief. 
Next, the Deputies now assert they are not really challenging the County's adoption 
of the pay plan, but its misapplication, which they say is "operational" and, therefore, not 
entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exception in §63-30-10(1). Appellees' 
Br. at 40-41. This assertion contradicts the Deputies' earlier listing of complaints about pay 
inequities, id, at 7-8, all of which were permitted by the compensation plan and policies. 
More importantly, however, the Deputies misunderstand the County's argument. The 
County does not seek the protection of the retention of immunity in §63-30-10(1) for 
discretionary functions, which by its terms applies to negligence actions for which 
governmental immunity has been waived. Instead, the County's argument is that there was 
no waiver of immunity for its actions in adopting and implementing a compensation plan, an 
argument to which the Deputies have not responded. 
IV. THE DEPUTIES' STATUTORY CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY A 
THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
"A civil action may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter, 
and after the cause of action has accrued. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1996). Under 
§78-12-26(4), an action for a liability created by state statute must be brought within three 
years. Thus, even if the Court were to conclude that § 17-30-5 creates a private right of action 
for damages, the Deputies' statutory claim would be barred. See Appellants' Br. at 38-40. 
Predictably, the Deputies first respond to this statute of limitations argument by 
contending that res judicata, based on the Diamant administrative outcome, bars the County 
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from even raising this defense. The County has already replied to this in Point II, supra. Just 
as predictably, the Deputies also assert that the County should be estopped from raising this 
defense based on the same response by Ms. Aiken to an interrogatory. See Appellees' Br. 
at 45 n.15. The County has already replied to this in Point I.D., supra. Next, the Deputies 
resort once more to characterizing their action as an equitable one that is subject to the four-
year statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1996). But, as the County has 
already shown above in Point LB., theirs is a legal action, not an equitable one. 
The Deputies do raise two new arguments. The first is that the wrong done to them 
is a continuing one that did not cease until September 1, 1994 when the County adopted a 
new compensation plan. As supporting authority, they rely on Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v. La 
Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995). Appellees' Br. at 42. Walker, however, involved 
claims for nuisance and trespass, and it had long been the law in Utah that, for statute of 
limitations purposes, accrual of these two causes of action depends on whether the nuisance 
or trespass is permanent or continuing. IcL at 1232 (citing to Thackerv v. Union Portland 
Cement. 231 P. 813, 814 (Utah 1924)). 
The Deputies have pointed to no Utah precedent extending this "continuing wrong" 
theory to a cause of action for violation of state statute that is subject to the three-year 
limitations period in § 78-12-26(4). Moreover, they have offered no reasons why this Court 
should depart from existing case law concerning accrual of causes of action for statutory 
violation, which focuses on when a plaintiff s injury became actionable. See Appellants' Br. 
at 39-40. 
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Finally, the Deputies argue that the statute of limitations was tolled while the Diamant 
lawsuit was pending, relying on the rule announced in American Tierra Corp. v. City of West 
Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992). Appellees' Br. at 43-44. In American Tierra, this Court 
held that "the commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as 
to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had class certification been 
approved." Id, at 762. Tolling is appropriate and useful "as long as the purported class is 
representative of all claims such that the defendant has adequate notice . . . . " Id. 
The American Tierra rule cannot toll the statute of limitations in the instant case 
because the Diamant complaint only pleaded a class of County employees who had "worked 
more than eight (8) hours in any given day of work for the four (4) years immediately 
preceding the filing of this Complaint." (R. 505-519, Diamant Complaint at f 11-13). 
Moreover, this putative class's pleaded claim was a constitutional tort under the Utah 
Constitution. Id_ Thus, the filing of the Diamant complaint could not have provided the 
County with adequate notice of the contract and statutory claims asserted by the Deputies 
here, and tolling would be inappropriate under American Tierra. 
The County urges this Court to apply the three-year limitations period in § 78-12-26(4) 
starting from January 1, 1992, when the Deputies' statutory claims became actionable, i.e., 
when all the Deputies were paid under the challenged compensation plan and policies. Since 
this action was not filed until January 1996, more than three years later, the Deputies' 
statutory claims are barred. See Appellants' Br. at 38-40. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those addressed in its opening brief, the County asks 
this Court to vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of the Deputies and to remand 
the case to the trial court with directions to dismiss with prejudice the contract and statutory 
claims of all 124 plaintiffs. 
If the Court concludes the 19 Deputies who filed a notice of claim have stated a 
statutory claim for relief, the County asks the Court to vacate the summary judgment entered 
in favor of the Deputies and remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter 
judgment in the County's favor because: the Deputies' claims are barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations; the County retains immunity for adopting the challenged compensation 
plan and policies; or the challenged compensation plan and policies fully comply with the 
governing statutes. 
Alternatively, if the Court concludes the Deputies are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on their statutory claims, the County asks this Court to modify the judgment in favor 
of the Deputies by: eliminating judgment and all damages awarded to the 105 Deputies who 
failed to file a notice of claim required by the Governmental Immunity Act; and eliminating 
the award of prejudgment interest to the 15 plaintiffs awarded damages who did file a notice 
of claim. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Sheriffs office to participate in the arbitration if she was not receiving equal pay with her peers. 
Thus, the County should have notified the Plaintiff in writing of her rights to participate in the 
arbitration. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 4: Addressing paragraph 13 of the Third Amended 
Complaint, please provide the following: 
(1) who informed you that you should wait until a final decision was reached in the 
Diamant case before taking any further steps to remedy the pay inequities and that you would 
receive the same wage compensation as those named plaintiffs in the Diamant case? 
(2) how did the person identified in (1) above know to contact you? 
(3) what did this person actually tell you? 
(4) by what means were you informed? 
(5) please identify and attach any memorandums, documents, papers, notes, letters or 
accounts that relate to this interrogatory. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Plaintiff is a member of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs Association ("Association"). The Association, through its elected officers, was 
informed by Sheriff Kennard and other representatives of the Sheriffs Office that the interests of 
all sworn employees were represented in the Diamant action; that the County would pay all the 
employees their respective back pay in the event the arbitrator found the existence of a pay 
inequity; and that employees should not file separate actions or grievances because it would 
delay and complicate the resolution of the issues presented in the Diamant action. Plaintiff also 
refers Defendants to the sworn deposition testimony of former Commissioner James Bradley. 
3 
Mr. Bradley testified that the County agreed to pay all sworn employees their respective back 
pay if the arbitrator found the existence of a pay inequity. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Addressing paragraph 14 of the Third Amended 
Complaint, please provide the following: 
(1) who assured you that you would be treated the same as those named plaintiffs in 
the Diamant case? 
(2) how did the person identified in (1) above know to contact you? 
(3) what did this person actually tell you? 
(4) by what means were you informed? 
(5) please identify and attach any memorandums, documents, papers, notes, letters or 
accounts that relate to this interrogatory. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 4. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Addressing paragraph 15 of the Third Amended 
Complaint, please provide the following: 
(1) who informed you that the named plaintiffs in the Diamant arbitration have 
prevailed on their claims for back pay and will be receiving compensation for the defendants for 
the pay disparity? 
(2) how did the person identified in (1) above know to contact you? 
(3) what did this person actually tell you? 
(4) by what means were you informed? 
(5) please identify and attach any memorandums, documents, papers, notes, letters or 
accounts that relate to this interrogatory. 
/ - • > * y y v 
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(11 policy is today. Is it your understanding that county 
[2| policy would mandate that the commission or the county treat 
[3| similarly situated employees equally? 
[4| A: 1 would hope that the policy reflected that, but 
$1 I can't say that I read that as a fact, you know, in some 
61 policy statement But 1 think, certainly; my impression was 
71 that we would strive very hard to do that. 
81 Q: Let me put it the opposite way. Would you agree 
9] with me that it would be inconsistent with county policy for 
oi the county to knowingly treat inequitably similarly situated 
1] employees relating to pay? 
2] A: I don't know whether to answer yes or no because 
3} I have to diagram that sentence. Let's see here. Tm not 
*} aware that the county supported or condoned any situations 
5} where a group of employees by virtue of their employment or 
BJ the department they worked in or the nature of their work 
7[ that wc wanted to sec them treated any diffcrendy in terms 
$ of the way they were paid. 
5j As I said earlier, certain classes of employees, 
JJ i.e., the deputies, could make arguments that they should 
il be - that we should look at the structure of paying them 
2] differendy by virtue of their job. But I think the 
\] overriding goal of the county was to pay people for work 
il done, pure and simplcAnd if we could all do it under one 
^ system, that was nice and easy and efficient. If we 
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j couldn't, wc would have to struggle and find a better way to 
r doit. 
] Q: Okay. Let me see if I can make it even easier so 
I we don't have so many possibilities. Let's talk about one 
I class of employees. And just for ease of the situation, 
I let's assume were talking about deputy sheriffs -
I A: Okay. 
I Q: - who have all been employed the exact same 
number of years or they're all similarly situated -
i A: Uh-huh Caffirmative). 
Q: - and all in that same class. 
Would it be inconsistent with county policy, as 
you understood it, to within that CISLSS treat similarly 
situated employees inequitably regarding payment? 
A: I would think - I would - my recollection is 
that that would - that would be an inconsistency that 
should not exist if it did. 
Q: You indicated that you were somewhat familiar 
with the Diamant lawsuit. Based on your understanding, who 
did you believe that that lawsuit - who did you believe 
were the parties that that lawsuit represented? 
A: Well, deputy sheriffs - or no - or were they 
deputy sheriffs? They were employees of the sheriffs 
office. I thought she was an investigator, though, or 
something. 
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[11 THE WITNESS: Are t h e y considered deputy 
Pi sheriffs, too? 
Pi MS. BECKSTEAD: (Nodded head in the 
{4i affirmative.) 
\s\ Q: (By Mr. Moscon) Did you understand it was a suit 
[6i on behalf of only a f e w of them or on all of them, assuming 
PI they were deputy sheriffs? 
[s\ A: I didn't think it w a s a class action. L thought 
j pi it was s o m e specif ic p e o p l e w h o brought suit. Now, whether, 
j [ioi you k n o w - but w h e t h e r it w a s - I mean, if they could make 
fli] their case - in their specific case, w e would presume that 
[12J everybody e l se that fell in to a similar situation should b e 
[13] treated t h e same as t h e y W e weren' t breaking t h e m out, 
[141 saying, okay, because they're suing and they're going to get 
[15} s o m e reso lve , hopeful ly that only they are subject t o that 
| [1«1 that - you know, what was good for them would be good for 
| [17J others, I would presume. 
[18J I think that w a s our - n o t remembering right n o w 
[18} wi thout rev iewing it, the details of that case or anything 
[201 else, but i t w a s m y recollection i s that however that w a s to 
pii be resolved, it should b e integrated into the total system 
P2] that all p e o p l e in that class should have the same outcome 
[23J benefited to them. 
[241 Q: Okay. Fair enough. 
psj Are you aware at any time of any notices given by 
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[11 the county to employees of the sheriffs office that 
[21 indicated to them if you do not put your name on this list 
Pi or if you do not file this suit, we will not treat you the 
[4i same way that we'll treat others who do put their name on 
[51 that list or join that lawsuit? Are you aware of any such 
[6j notice going out? 
[7] A: Boy, Tm not.That doesn't mean it didn't 
[8j happen. I wasn't aware of it, nor did i direct any to be 
PI sent. 
[ioi Q: Okay. I don't think I have any further 
[111 questions. 
[121 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 
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